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Rael v. Taylor and the Colorado Constitution:
How Human Rights Law Ensures




Many Practitioners and scholars in the United States have adopted
the position that the ratification of human rights treaties adds little or
nothing to the protection of rights in America.1 This is due to a per-
ceived advanced state of constitutional rights protection. 2 However,
most international human rights advocates have lamented the apparent
lack of impact that the ratification of the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights [ICCPR] has had on U.S. jurisprudence. They
blame this on the many reservations, understandings, and declarations
attached during its ratification by the Senate. 3
The impact of the ratification has yet to be fully understood as an
extremely important interpretive device for federal and state constitu-
tions.4 One such area is the vertical and horizontal character of human
The author would like to thank the Rocky Mountain Human Rights Law Group, Eliot
Grossman, and Silke Sahl for comments on earlier drafts and for their help in locating
relevant, but sometimes obscure, materials. The author would also like to thank Profes-
sor Ved P. Nanda for his omnipresent tolerance, inspiration, and support.
1. One practitioner raises the following question: "why should I apply international
human rights law, which I can't even shepardize and which I have trouble finding, in a
lawsuit between Californians raising issues of California law?" He goes on, however, to
discuss how human rights can be useful in promoting rights in state courts. Paul
Hoffman, The Application of International Human Rights Law in State Courts: A View
from California, 18 INT'L LAW. 61, 62 (1984). One scholar indicates there are difficulties
in using human rights law for "international law is a mystery to most judges." Curtis A.
Bradely & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Federal Common Law: A
Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 815, 815 (1997).
2. For example, the State Department claims that "because the basic rights and
fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights... have
long been protected as a matter of federal constitutional and statutory law, it was not
considered necessary to adopt special implementing legislation to give effect to the Cove-
nant's provisions in domestic law." Initial Report of the United States of America to the
U.N. Human Rights Committee under the International Covenant of Civil and Political
Rights, at 29 (July 1994). For an opposing view, see, Dorothy Q. Thomas, Essay: Advanc-
ing Rights Protection in the United States: An International Advocacy Strategy, 9 HARV.
HuM. RTS. J. 15 (1996).
3. See, e.g., Cherif Bassiouni, Reflections on Ratification of the International Cove-
nant on Civil and Political Rights by the United States Senate, 42 DEPAUL L. REV. 1169
(1993).
4. Some scholars have predicted and suggested that advocates can use the Covenant
"as an interpretive aid, and it is likely with U.S. ratification of the treaty, this role... will
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rights, which means human rights law will have an important evolu-
tionary impact on the application of constitutional rights, not only in
the public, but also in the private sphere.5
This article will show the vital role the ICCPR should play in re-
solving a case pending in the Colorado courts since 1981, involving the
descendants of the original Mexican settlers to Southern Colorado and
their struggle to regain land rights with a 150 year history. The ratifi-
cation of the ICCPR should profoundly alter the traditional "state ac-
tion" limitation in cases seeking to vindicate constitutionally protected
rights. The ICCPR should form the constitutional arguments made in
the case of Rael et al. v. Taylor.6
The ICCPR was originally drafted as a blueprint for a society where
human rights are respected by all. The effect on traditional constitu-
tional analysis is the creation of a transparent method for the examina-
tion of all rights involved and the value judgments underlying them.
This is true even when the alleged violator has traditionally been con-
sidered a private actor and therefore free from scrutiny.7
This article will provide a short history of Rael v. Taylor; outline
the constitutional analysis of the case prior to the ICCPR; discuss the
ratification of the ICCPR and its meaning; and conclude with a consti-
expand." Jordan J. Paust, Avoiding Fraudulent Executive Policy: Analysis of the Non-
Self-Execution of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 42 DEPAUL L. REV. 1257,
1277 (1993).
5. For a thorough overview of the practical and theoretical development of horizon-
tal human rights, see ANDREW CLAPHAM, HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE PRIVATE SPHERE (1993).
The terms "horizontal" and "private" sphere are used as descriptive categories which re-
flect a particular legal history. These distinctions or terms are not capable of describing
reality.
6. In 1981 a group of citizens representing the heirs and successors in the interest of
the original settlers of the Sangre de Cristo grant filed a civil action in Costilla County
District Court to quiet title to the "Mountain Tract" or la sierra and alternatively, for
damages. Rael v. Taylor, Civil Action No. 81CV5 (Dist. Ct. Costilla Cty. Colo., 1981). The
District Court granted defendant Taylor's motion for summary judgement holding that
the action was barred by the principle of res judicata and certain statutes of limitation.
The court cited two related actions. The first is a Torrens action filed by Taylor in U.S.
District Court in 1960. In this action, title to the Mountain Tract or la sierra was con-
firmed and registered in Taylor's name. Taylor v. Jaquez, Civil Action No. 6904 (D. Colo.
Oct. 5, 1965). The 10th Circuit affirmed the lower court's holding, reasoning that the U.S.
Congressional confirmatory Act of 1860 extinguished any usufructuary rights derived
from Mexican law. Sanchez v. Taylor, 377 F.2d 733, 737 (10th Cir. 1967). The second is a
quiet title action filed in 1960 by Taylor's predecessor in interest regarding the Salazar
tract. Salazar v. Allis, Civil Action No. 1483 (Dist. Ct. Costilla Cty., Colorado July 8,
1960). The 1981 District Court ruling was appealed. The decision was affirmed by the
Colorado Court of Appeals. Rael v. Taylor, 832 P.2d 1011 (Colo. Ct. App. 1991). The
Court of Appeals ruling was appealed. The Colorado Supreme Court affirmed in part and
reversed in part, the lower court's ruling. Rael v. Taylor, 876 P.2d 1210 (Colo. 1994). Spe-
cifically, the Colorado Supreme Court held that the due process rights of the heirs may
have been violated during the 1960 Torrens action and for that reason the application of
res judicata would be inappropriate, and remanded the case for further action. Id. at
1229.
7. See generally, Duncan Kennedy, The Status and Decline of the Public/Private
Distinction, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1349 (1982).
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tutional analysis of the Rael case in light of the ICCPR's ratification.
II. THE HISTORY OF RAEL V. TAYLOR
In 1844, what is now Costilla County, Colorado, was Mexican terri-
tory including the land presently in contention in the Rael v. Taylor
case.8 That year the Mexican government issued to Narcisco Beaubien
and Stephen Luis Lee the Sangre de Cristo land grant on the condition
they encourage settlement in that area.9 As was the custom at that
time, Mexican law granted the businessmen a portion of the land with
the remainder to be divided among the successful homesteaders and
common areas. 10 These common areas would be used as pastures and a
mountain tract for hunting, fishing, wood gathering and as a water
supply. The land used for these common areas was held by the commu-
nity with usufructuary rights to all settlers, however, title to the land
reserved for common use was most often held by the local government
or community but it could be held by the federal government or by an
individual."
In the early 1800's, Mexico and the United States were competing
to expand into what is now the Southwestern part of the United
States.' 2 The Mexican government used attractive incentives to per-
suade settlers into this area. 13 It allowed title to be recognized without
being formalized until after the land had already been settled. Even
without formalized title, the general pattern of settlement was well
known and systematically followed. 14 This made custom an extremely
important part of Mexican land law during this period of rapid expan-
sion.15
8. See, e.g., Calvin Trillin, U.S. Journal: Costilla County, Colorado A Little Cloud on
the Title, NEW YORKER, Apr. 26, 1976, at 122.
9. For a complete study of the land grant and its sociological and anthropological
impact on the region, see Marianne L. Stoller, The History of the Sangre de Cristo Land
Grant and the Claims of the People of the Culebra River Villages on the Lands (unpub-
lished manuscript 1980). Attached as an exhibit to plaintiff's brief in opposition to Motion
for Summary Judgement in 1981 civil action.
10. Typically 30% was awarded to the grantee (businessman). The remainder was to
be held individually and in common by the settlers. FREDERIC HALL, THE LAWS OF
MEXICO: A COMPILATION AND TREATISE 103-06 (1885).
11. GEORGE MCCUTCHEN McBRIDE, THE LAND SYSTEMS OF MEXICO 107-111 (1923).
12. See Placido Gomez, The History and Adjudication of the Common Lands of Span-
ish and Mexican Land Grants, 25 NAT. RESOURCES J. 1039, 1065 (1985).
13. The terms did not improve only for the settlers, but for the grantee as well. In
that larger tracts of land than typically granted were being distributed by the Mexican
government to facilitate settlement of its northern border. Id. at 1066.
14. MCBRIDE, supra note 11, at 1, 57, 85.
15. At this point, custom and usage became even more important:
The supreme authorities of the remote province of New Spain, afterwards
the Republic of Mexico, exercised from time immemorial certain prerogatives
and powers, which, although not positively sanctioned by congressional en-
actments, were universally conceded by the Spanish and Mexican govern-
ments; and there being no evidence that these prerogatives and powers were
revoked or repealed by the supreme authorities, it is to be presumed that the
exercise of the them was lawful.
Tameling v. U.S. Freehold and Emigration Co., 93 U.S. 644, 658 (1876)(quoting William
1997
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The original grantees, Narcisco Beaubien and Stephen Luis Lee,
were killed in 1847 during the Taos Rebellion. 16 Narcisco's father,
Carlos Beaubien, inherited his son's undivided one-half interest in the
property and purchased the remaining interest from Lee's estate.17 By
1848, when the governance of that area was transferred from Mexico to
the United States, the necessary steps to fulfill the terms of the land
grant had been well underway.18 Following a change of sovereignty, the
underlying property claims remain unchanged.' 9 Settlement in Sangre
de Cristo continued in accord with the terms of original Mexican
grant.20
In accordance with the terms of the original Sangre de Cristo grant,
a tract of mountain land was set aside as common area (la sierra). La
sierra compromised a portion of what is now the Sangre de Cristo
mountain range. In 1863, Beaubien memorialized the original Mexican
settler's rights to this communal tract of land in a document referencing
two types of common areas; pasture lands (la vega) and mountain lands
(la sierra). This document states:
Town of San Luis of Culebra, May 11, 1863 Book 1, Page 256.
It has been decided that the Rito Seco lands shall remain uncultivated
for the use of the residents of San Luis, San Pablo, and the Vallejos,
and other inhabitants of said towns, for pastures and community
Pelham, Surveyor General in relation to the Sangre de Cristo land grant, Dec.30, 1856).
16. Id.
17. Rael, 876 P.2d at 1210, 1213.
18. Treaty of Peace, Friendship, Limits and Settlement with the Republic of Mexico,
Feb. 2 1848, U.S. - Mex., 9 Stat. 922 [hereinafter Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo].
19. The concept of conquest in international law called for the new sovereign to rec-
ognize and respect the property rights of the previous inhabitants of the territory it had
just acquired. This concept was clearly established in U.S. courts. United States v.
Percheman, 32 U.S. 51, 88 (1833). Fisher v. Allen, 3 Miss. (2 Howard) 611 (1837) (holding
that a change in citizenship cannot interfere with the rights to property previously ac-
quired). In fact, the U.S. Supreme Court reiterated this same principle in a case deline-
ating the boundaries of the Sangre de Cristo land grant. "We have repeatedly held that
individual rights of property, in the territory acquired by the United States from Mexico,
were not affected by the change sovereignty and jurisdiction." Tameling, 93 U.S. at 661.
The Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo recognized this concept in its text:
Mexicans now established in territories previously belonging to Mexico...
shall be free to continue to reside, or remove at any time to the Mexican re-
public, retaining the property which they possess in the said territories ....
In the said territories, property of every kind, now belonging to Mexicans not
established there, shall be inviolably respected. Mexicans who, in the terri-
tories aforesaid... shall be incorporated into the Union of the United States,
and be admitted at the proper time (to be judged by the Congress of the
United States) to the enjoyment of all the rights of citizens of the United
States, according to the principles of the constitution; and in the mean time
shall be maintained and protected in the free enjoyment of their liberty and
property, and secured in the free exercise of their religion without restric-
tion.
Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, supra note 18, Arts. VIII, IX.
20. Stoller, supra note 9, at 26-30.
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grounds, etc. And that Rito Seco waters are hereby distributed among
the said inhabitants of the town of San Luis, and those on the other
side of the vega, whose lands lie in the vicinity and cannot be irrigated
by the water of the Rio Culebra.
All the inhabitants shall have the use of pasture, wood, water, and
timber and the mills that have been erected shall remain where they
are, not interfering with the rights of others. No stock shall be allowed
in said lands, except for household purposes. All those who come as
settlers shall agree to abide by the rules and regulations and shall
help, as good citizens and be provided with the necessary weapons for
the defense of the settlement.2 1
This statement is entirely typical of Mexican land grants from that
time.22
The Mexican land grant's common area provisions are reminiscent
of the practice brought by early settlers from England to United
States. 23 La vega is one of the few common pasture areas recognized by
United States courts West of the Mississippi River. 24
While the original Mexican homesteaders continued to settle the
area, the United States government recognized the entire Sangre de
Cristo grant.25 During this period plots were provided to the settlers for
cultivation and they were also given usufructuary rights to la vega and
la sierra. In 1864, when Beaubien transferred the underlying fee in la
sierra he reaffirmed the traditional usufructuary rights of the original
21. Rael, 876 P.2d at 1231 (quoting a document executed by Carlos Beaubien on May
11, 1863 translated from the Spanish original).
22. The Spanish colonies in the new world normally held pasture lands, mountains,
and water in common for the use of the residents of the settlement. "We have ordained
that pastures, mountains, and water, shall be common in the Indies." JOHN SAYLES AND
HENRY SAYLES, EARLY LAWS OF TEXAs 3, Vol. 26 (2d ed. 1891) (discussing the Law and
Decrees of Spain relating to land in Mexico). This practice of colonial Spain filtered into
Mexican law. See MCBRIDE, supra note 11, at 1, 57, 85.
23. Such a property arrangement characterized feudal agrarian society. See, e.g.,
MARC BLOCH, FEUDAL SOCIETY (L.A. Manyon trans., 2d ed. 1962) (1961). For a more ex-
tensive overview of the legal history relevant to the case, see Richard D. Garcia & Todd
Howland, Determining the Legitimacy of Spanish Land Grants in Colorado: Conflicting
Values, Legal Pluralism, and Demystification of the Sangre De Cristo/Rael Case, 16
CHICANO-LATINO L. REV. 39 (1995).
24. Costilla State Development Company v. Delphino Salazar, Civil Action No. 118
(Dist. Ct. Costilla Cty., Colo., Jan. 21, 1916).
25. In accord with the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, the U.S. Surveyor General made
findings and recommendations regarding property which had become part of U.S. terri-
tory. The U.S. Congress confirmed that the legal owner under Mexican law of the Sangre
de Cristo grant was Carlos Beaubien. This as well as a number of other land grants were
confirmed by U.S. Congress through, An Act to Confirm Certain Private Land-Claims in
the Territory of New Mexico, June 21, 1860, ch. 167, 12 Stat. 71-72 (1860). This confirma-
tion eventually provided Beaubien with a quitclaim deed to the property related to the
grant, the relevant section of which reads: "this patent shall only be construed as a quit-
claim deed or relinquishment on the part of the United States, and shall not affect the
adverse right of any other person or persons whomever." Following a lengthy debate over
the exact size of the grant, in 1880 a Congressional patent was issued based upon the
1860 confirmation. Tameling, 93 U.S. 644. See also Stoller, supra note 9, at 33-35.
1997
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Mexican settlers. 26
Geographic isolation, combined with the rather unusual property
arrangement for that period of American legal history nurtured a
unique, self-sufficient culture. The land provided all the of the settler's
needs, from subsistence agriculture on their individual tracts, to hunt-
ing, fishing, and wood gathering on la sierra. In fact, without access to
la sierra it would have been impossible for the settlers and their de-
scendants to have survived. For one hundred and fifty years, the vil-
lages established by these settlers have continued to function in the
same manner, preserving a unique American heritage found nowhere
else. The language, religion, and customs practiced by the descendants
of the original settlers can be traced back to historic Spanish-Indio cul-
ture.2
7
In 1960, major changes began to unfold in Costilla County. John
(Jack) T. Taylor, a North Carolina lumberman, purchased the underly-
ing fee of approximately 77,000 acres of la sierra. His purchase in-
cluded the Culebra Mountain, the only privately owned 14,000 foot
mountain peak in the state of Colorado. 28 Taylor's deed contains lan-
guage similar to the 1863 County Record, indicating he was fully aware
that the descendants of the original settlers of the Sangre de Cristo
grant had usufructuary rights to the property he was purchasing.29 La
sierra was adjacent to the individual tracts of property used by the
original settlers for agricultural purposes and as common pasture
lands [la vega?J. Taylor fenced in areas of la sierra, infringing the tra-
ditional usufructuary rights. This generated a steadily increasing ten-
sion which continues to divide the region. 30
In 1961, Taylor filed a Torrens action in Denver (250 miles from
Costilla County) attempting to register his recently acquired property
without recognizing the original settlers' descendants' usufructuary
rights mentioned in his deed. Taylor named in his Torrens action only
26. The instrument of conveyance from the estate of Carlos Beaubien to William Gil-
pin reads:
[Certain settlement rights before then conceded by said Charles Beaubien to
residents of the settlements of Costilla, Culebra and Trinchera, within said
Tract included, shall be confirmed by said William Gilpin as made by him,
the said Charles Beaubien during his [sic] occupancy of said Tract and as
understood and agreed by and between him and said settlers.
Rael, 876 P.2d at 1213-14.
27. See generally Stoller, supra note 9, for a more extensive discussion of this aspect
of development of the community which grew out of the original grant.
28. Id.
29. In Rael, the Court stated:
[alll of the land hereby conveyed being subject to rights of way of record and
all rights of way heretofore located and now maintained and used on,
through, over and across the same; and also subject to claims of the local
people by prescription or otherwise to right to pasture, wood, and lumber and
so-called settlements [sic] rights in, to and upon said land, but not subject to
rights granted by the party of the first part or its predecessors from and after
January 1, 1900; and also subject to taxes for the year 1960 and subsequent
years, and existing leases, if any.
Rael, 876 P.2d at 1214.
30. Trillin, supra note 8.
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about 15% of the readily ascertainable landowners that would be af-
fected. 3' The U.S. District Court granted Taylor's request to extinguish
the usufructuary rights of the original settlers and their descendants
even though they had been using that land in question in an uninter-
rupted fashion for more then one hundred and fifty years. The court
did not require Taylor to give notice to almost 85% of the landowners
who were affected by its decision.3 2 This decision was affirmed by the
U.S. Circuit Court.3 3
With the court supported and enforced fencing of la sierra, tensions
remained high and the residents of Costilla County suffered a major
economic downturn, due to the dislocation from their traditional way of
life. Descendants of the original settlers were arrested for attempting
to exercise their traditional rights.34 By 1978, Costilla County had the
highest percentage in Colorado of residents receiving public assistance -
about one half of all adult residents.3 5 Residents were disaffected with
a system that did not recognize their rights, and for the most part did
not even give them a day in court before their rights were stripped
away. The descendants of the original settlers suffered both material
loss in well-being and a loss of dignity stemming from the loss of their
traditional way of life and self-sufficiency.3 6
In 1981, some of the descendants of the original settlers of the San-
gre de Cristo land grant and residents of Costilla County banded to-
gether to file a claim against Taylor. Their claim alleged that Taylor
had violated their traditional rights without ever having their day in
court. This challenge failed in the district,37 and appellate courts.3 8 The
31. Costilla County property records listed almost all those who would have been af-
fected by the decision.
32. Taylor v. Jaquez, No. 96-1426, 1997 WL 627025, at *1 (D. Colo. 1997).
33. Sanchez v. Taylor, 377 F.2d 733, 737 (10th Cir. 1967).
34. Trillin, supra note 8.
35. Stoller, supra note 9, at 91.
36. The most recent complaint (District Court of Colorado 1997) of the heirs of the
original settlers lists a number of causes of action, which include: Plaintiffs' properties
received and became affixed with easements by grant or dedication to use the Historical
(usufructuary) Rights on the Mountain Tract. Plaintiffs are, third party beneficiaries to
the existence of the covenants and servitudes, which covenants and servitudes served to
impress and burden the Mountain Tract, and to benefit the Plaintiffs' properties. Plain-
tiffs' properties, acquired easements which are implied both by pre-existing use and by
necessity to use the Historical Rights on the Mountain Tract. Plaintiffs' properties,
through open, continuous, notorious, hostile and adverse use, acquired easements by pre-
scription to use the Historical Rights on the Mountain Tract. Beaubien and his succes-
sors-in-interest granted licenses, which have ripened into easements. Circumstances sur-
rounding the creation of the Historical Rights warrants imposition of an equitable trust
against the Mountain Tract. Heirs and successors of the original settlers are entitled to
continued communal use of the Historic Rights in the Mountain Tract in accordance with
Mexican law and custom that established these rights. The application of these rights is
protected by the Constitution of the State of Colorado as informed by binding human
rights law, by international treaties, including the Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo, as well
as international legal principles recognized in U.S. courts, including the law of conquest.
Plaintiffs Complaint, Rael v. Taylor, Civil Action No. 81CV5 (Dist. Ct. Costilla Cty., Colo.,
1981).
37. Rael v. Taylor, Civil Action No. 81CV5 (Dist. Ct. Costilla Cty., Colo., 1981).
38. Rael v. Taylor, 832 P.2d 1011 (Colo. Ct. App. 1991).
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Colorado Supreme Court, however, held in favor of the residents stat-
ing that the defendant Taylor did not provide adequate notice to those
his original Torrens action would divest, given the ease of identifying all
potentially injured parties.39 The case has now been remanded to the
district court to allow the settler's descendants to argue their rights
were violated when Taylor stripped them of their usufructuary rights to
la sierra.40
The descendants of the original settlers challenge Taylor's action of
cutting access to la sierra, and thereby depriving them of their tradi-
tional rights to hunt, fish, and gather wood.4 1 The descendants also
claim that Taylor's actions have destroyed their livelihood, their way of
life, and their community. These effects indicate that some cluster of
rights has been violated, however, the difficulty presented is in deter-
mining whether any of those rights create a cause of action which is
recognizable in a U.S. court. Should an action exist, the Taylor's rights
to enjoy the use of his land, and the usufructuary rights of the settler's
descendants are in conflict and will need to be resolved.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND RAEL V. TAYLOR PRE-ICCPR
Traditionally, scholars have viewed the 1791 Bill of Rights to the
U.S. Constitution as an attempt to curtail the central government's in-
fringement of rights of individuals. 42 Early court cases restricted the
Federal governments powers, it was not until the 13th [1865] and 14th
[1868] Amendments to the Constitution were passed that focus shifted
to any infringement of an individual's rights.43
Although most scholars have views the language of the Bill of
Rights as limitations placed on the Federal government, there is some
ambiguity as to their application on state governments. The 14th
Amendment clearly eliminates that ambiguity placing a firm restriction
on state governments. 44 Additionally, the 13th Amendment creates a
constitutional right for individuals against other individuals. 45
39. Rael v. Taylor, 876 P.2d 1210 (Colo. 1994).
40. Two of the three kinds of property derived from the original land grant have al-
ways been recognized as valid. The individual plots for cultivation and the common land
for pasturing. Costilla State Development Company v. Delphino Salazar, et. al., Civil Ac-
tion No. 118 (Dist. Ct. Costilla Cty., Colo., Jan. 21, 1916). But the usufructuary rights to
the Mountain Tract or la sierra were interrupted in 1961 and with active state interven-
tion have not been exercised since.
41. The popular press is already following the issue closely as it involves a number of
issues, like sustainable living and respect for the environment, that are widely valued in
Colorado. See, e.g., Jillian Lloyd, 150-Year-Old Land dispute Intensifies in Colorado,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Mar. 3, 1997, at 4.
42. See, e.g., Lawrence M. Friedman, Borders: On the Emerging Sociology of Transna-
tional Law, 32 STAN. J. INT'L L. 65, 78 (1996).
43. Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833).
44. "No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States .... U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §1.
45. "Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except, as a punishment for crime
whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or
any place subject to their jurisdiction." U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, §1.
VOL. 26:1
RAEL V. TAYLOR
U.S. jurisprudence has moved slowly to reflect these changes:
It took from 1868 to 1925 for the Supreme Court to rule that the Four-
teenth Amendment protection of life, liberty, and property against
state attacks including attacks on the rights set forth in the First
Amendment. The first time a statute was over turned for violating the
First Amendments was 1931. And it was 1953 before the Supreme
Court upheld the conviction of a large Washington, D.C. department
store for discriminating against Negro customers in violation of the
acts of 1872 and 1873 passed by the Legislative Assembly of the Dis-
trict of Columbia. It was 1968 before the Supreme Court upheld a
challenge to the practice of refusing to sell a home to a Negro under the
law passed in 1866.46
It has taken time to accept the idea that States must respect the
rights contained in the Bill of Rights. The idea that individuals must
respect the rights contained in the Bill of Rights has been a much more
convoluted process.
After the Civil War, the Supreme Court did not embrace the idea
that it should protect individuals from violation committed by another
individual. The Court developed the "state action" distinction, whereby
a deprivation of a constitutional right is remediable only when a state
actor is responsible. 47 In the Civil Rights cases of 1883, the Court at-
tempted to create a distinction between public and private deprivations
of an individual's rights. Discrimination in the private sphere was a
protected constitutional right, while in the public sphere, it was a blight
that was to be stuck down.48 A whole tapestry of cases has followed
trying to draw a clear distinction between these spheres. 49 Many judi-
cial resources have been expended trying to avoid looking seriously at
the rights of both parties and determining how and why one person's
rights should prevail.
While a number of scholars have attempted to clarify the distinc-
tion between public and private deprivations, one gets the feeling that
the distinctions being made are a bit slippery.50 In some cases it has
been argued that "[rlights created by the first section of the 14th
46. Ann Fagan Ginger, The Energizing Effect of Enforcing a Human Rights Treaty, 42
DEPAUL L. REV. 1341, 1352-53 (1993) (construing Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666
(1925); Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931); District of Columbia v. John R.
Thompson, Co., 346 U.S. 100 (1953); and Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409
(1968)). Note also that it was not until 1962 that the Eighth Amendment was applied to
the States.
47. David Pickle, Comment, State Court Approaches to the State Action Requirement:
Private Rights, Public Values, and Constitutional Choices, 39 U. KAN. L. REV. 495 (1990-
1991).
48. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
49. Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915) (allowing employers to discriminate against
union members in employment decisions); West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379
(1937) (upholding minimum wage by reading liberty to protect against attacks on welfare
by individual, even though the defendant claimed his right to liberty protected his free-
dom to contract); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946) (Court reviewed and overturned
state preference for the property right of a mall owner, over the rights of freedom of ex-
pression of others).
50. See, e.g., LAWRENCE TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL CHOICES 259-60 (1985).
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Amendment are, by its terms, guaranteed to the individual. The rights
established are personal rights."51 While in other cases it has been ar-
gued that "[n]othing in the Due Process Clause itself requires the State
to protect life, liberty, property of its citizens against an invasion by
private actors."52 The reasoning of this line of cases presupposes that
the world is divided between public and private spheres, that assump-
tion is difficult to fit into today's world.53
The lines between state and non-state actors are blurring, if there
ever was a clear distinction. Today, for example private organizations
are running prisons and schools, increasing the number of institutions
that perform traditional "state functions." There are symbiotic rela-
tionships requiring state compulsion to be valid. For example, private
property is nothing without government intervention and protection.5 4
The present state of the law normally calls for legislative action be-
fore constitutional rights can be applied against governments [horizon-
tally] or between individuals [vertically]. Other than favoring the
status quo, some scholars believe that the distinction between public
and private is not legally justifiable, nor desirable, in that it helps sus-
tain the racist and male dominated aspects of society.5 5 Implicit in a no
state action holding is a declaration that a claim has no constitutional
merit. As scholars have noted, it would be intellectually more honest
and beneficial for society to openly discuss the rights in conflict in a
transparent fashion, strike a balance, or if necessary, confirm that one
side's right is more important then the others. 56
The distinction between public and private law is considered by so-
ciologist to be inappropriate.5 7 Durkheim has said: "All law is private in
the sense that it is always about individuals who are presented and
acting; but more importantly, all law is public, in the sense that it is a
social function and that all individuals are, whatever their various ti-
tles, functionaries of society."58
IV. RATIFICATION ON THE ICCPR AND ITS MEANING
President Carter signed the ICCPR and transmitted it to the Sen-
ate for its advice and consent in 1977. 59 Fifteen years later it was rati-
51. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
52. DeShaney v. Winnebage Cty. Soc. Serv., 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
53. For a criticism of the underlying assumption and the values attached to it, see
Duncan Kennedy, The Status and Decline of the Public/Private Distinction, 130 U. PA. L.
REV. 1349 (1982).
54. For a more detailed discussion of this area, see Pickle, supra note 47.
55. E.g., Kennedy, supra note 53.
56. Pickle, supra note 47, at 499, 505, 516.
57. CLAPHAM, supra note 5, at 131.
58. EMILE DURKHEIM, THE DIVISION OF LABOUR IN SOCIETY 68 (1964).
59. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), U.N.
GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 302, entered
into force Mar. 23, 1976 [hereinafter ICCPR]. The ICCPR has 27 substantive articles
touching on most aspects of what are generally classified as political and civil rights.
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flied by the Senate. 60
The ICCPR is considered to be one of the foundation documents of
human rights law. It is solidly grounded in the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights.61 The ICCPR is often refereed to as part of the Inter-
national Bill of Rights. 62 It took the world community 19 years to nego-
tiate and draft the ICCPR treaty, with the participation and consent of
one hundred and three nations as well as indirect input from non-
governmental organizations. 63 The United States delegation was one of
the more active groups during the drafting process.64
Despite the extensive United States participation in the ICCPR's
drafting, the Senate's ratification was remarkable in the number of
limitations and clarifications it attempted to attach to the treaty. The
Senate following extensive deliberations attached five reservations, five
understandings, and four declarations to the ratification of the
ICCPR.65 While both under international law 66 and in domestic courts,
the status of these attachments is questionable, 67 this article will focus
60. 138 CONG. REC. S4783 (daily ed. Apr. 2, 1992). The U.S. deposited its instruments
of ratification on June 8, 1992, reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 645 (1992). It was not until Sep-
tember 8, 1992 that the ICCPR entered into force in the United States. U.S. Department
of State Dispatch, Monday, May 16, 1994.
61. G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. Doc. A/810, at 72 (1948).
62. The other half of the International Bill of Rights is the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess.,
Supp. No. 16, at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), entered into force Jan. 3, 1976. See, e.g.,
Louis HENKIN, THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS (1987).
63. See HENKIN, supra note 62; see also, MARC J. BOSSUYT, GUIDE TO THE TRAVAUX
PREPARATOIRES OF THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS XIX,
XX (1987).
64. The U.S. even sat on the original eight-member drafting committee in June of
1947. Id. at XIX. A noted political scientist in the area has divided U.S. interest in hu-
man rights into four phases: 1945-1953, U.S. Limited Support; 1954-1974, U.S. Neglect;
1974-1981, U.S. Renewed Interest; and 1981-19?, Era of Subservience to Cold War Poli-
tics. David Forsythe, The United States, the United Nations, and Human Rights, in THE
UNITED STATES AND MULTILATERAL INSTITUTIONS, 261 (Margaret P. Karns & Karen A.
Mingst, eds. 1990).
65. For a detailed discussion, see David P. Stewart, United States Ratification of the
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: The Significance of Reservations, Understandings,
and Declarations, 42 DEPAUL L. REV. 1183 (1993).
66. Many countries registered complaints regarding the manner in which the U.S.
attempted to limit its treaty obligation. Countries such as Finland and Sweden referred
to article 19(c) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, adopted May 22, 1969, 8
I.L.M. 679 (1969), stating that regardless of what a country calls it, a reservation, under-
standing, or declaration, any attempt to opt out of what is the essence of the treaty is in-
compatible with its object and purpose. The countries reminded the U.S. that a party to
the treaty may not invoke provisions of its internal law as justification for failure to re-
spect provisions of the treaty. See UN Treaty Database (visited April 2, 1997)
<http://www.un.org/cgi-bin/treaty2.pl>. Given this principle of treaty construction, it is
questionable whether U.S. attempts to limit its obligations under the ICCPR through a
series of reservations, understandings, and declarations could withstand a challenge in
the International Court of Justice.
67. The non-self-execution provision found in the first declaration has been widely
criticized. Scholars have pointed out that self-execution is a judicial doctrine regarding
whether the obligations and wording in the treaty are sufficiently clear to ground a pri-
vate right of action. Some believe it is for the courts, not for the Senate to decide, espe-
cially given the fact that non-self-execution is at odds with the language of the treaty
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on what the Senate did not attempt to limit, thereby leaving no im-
pediment in the way of using those aspects of the treaty.
Article 2 of the ICCPR states: "Each State Party to the present
Convention undertakes to respect and ensure that all individuals
within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized
in the present Covenant, without distinction of any kind. . ."68 If the
Senate intended to exclude any possible application of the ICCPR in the
United States and in state courts, it would have entered a reservation
to article 2, it did not.69
The Senate, through one of its understandings, declared the
ICCPR's "non-self executing" in nature, and thereby attempted to avoid
litigation based directly upon the ICCPR. Instead, the Senate indicated
that the fundamental rights and freedoms protected by the ICCPR are
also guaranteed as a matter of U.S. law, both constitutional and statu-
tory, and can be effectively asserted by individuals in the judicial sys-
tem.7 0 This incorporationist position attempts to minimize the impact
of the ICCPR without denying it significance. In other words, the Sen-
ate looks to the interpretation of current law to reflect any modification
required by the ICCPR. This incorporationist position is seen in the
fifth understanding to the Senate's ratification of the ICCPR which
states "[the ICCPR] shall be implemented by the Federal Government
to the extent it exercises legislative and judicial jurisdiction over the
matters covered therein, and otherwise by the state and local govern-
ments."7
1
The Senate's attempts to limit the application of the ICCPR fall
mainly into three categories: the first relates to free speech, the second
relates to criminal procedural protections and punishment, and the
third relates to discrimination.7 2 The free speech limitation highlights
a different conception of this right than that found in the Covenant, in
that U.S. practice is civil libertarian based, while the ICCPR limits
speech that is offensive to human rights. In the second area, the Senate
which obligates a State Party to the ICCPR to provide an effective remedy when there is a
violation of a right contained in the Covenant. See, e.g., Paust, supra note 4, at 1265.
Other scholars have been more blunt with their criticism of the Senate. They posit that a
declaration regarding self-execution does not change the treaty obligation and does not
bind courts. Stefan R. Riesenfeld & Frederick M. Abbott, Foreword: Symposium on Par-
liamentary Participation in the Making and Operation of Treaties, 67 CHI-KENT L. REV.
293, 296-97 (1991). The D.C. Circuit has held that statements other than reservations
made by the Senate have no force of law. Power Authority v. Federal. Power Comm'n, 247
F.2d 538, 546 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
68. ICCPR, supra note 59, at Part II, art. 2.
69. John Quigely, The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the
Supremacy Clause, 42 DEPAUL L. REV. 1287 (1993).
70. Stewart, supra note 65, at 1203; see also, United States: Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations Report on the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
Jan. 30, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 645, 658-59.
71. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,




has no fundamental difference in conception regarding the rights in
question, but prefers a much more limited interpretation of what those
rights mean. For those rights, the Senate does not want the ICCPR to
expand or change the present U.S. interpretation. The last area, dis-
crimination, the Senate wanted to maintain the U.S. interpretation
which allows discrimination in the private sphere and where it is tied to
a rational government objective.
The Senate accepted many aspects of the ICCPR, indicating ap-
proval of the law and how that law had been interpreted by the UN and
other nations. Where the Senate differed in conception differed, the
Senate choose to placed a reservation, understanding or declaration on
its ratification of the ICCPR. The lengthy deliberations and number of
limitations made to the ICCPR indicate a rigorous attempt by the Sen-
ate to eliminate aspects which, from its perspective, were undesirable.
The wording of the ICCPR, its Traveaux Preparatoires [legislative
history], and the official interpretations of by the UN Human Rights
Committee indicate that the rights contained in the ICCPR are both
vertical and horizontal in nature. This allows them to be applied in
both the public and the private spheres. The Senate made no specific
limitation on this point, indicating its acceptance of this concept.
While the language of the ICCPR clearly sets out a duty on the
State Party to the treaty, it does not directly preclude application
against individuals.73 Most of the articles are written in an open style,
not specifying who has a duty. For example, article 7 states: "no one
shall be subjected to torture."74 Also, article 8 states: "no one shall be
held in slavery."75 Both of these articles are difficult to construe as only
applying against state action. Their plain meaning is that torture and
slavery are prohibited no matter who does it. This language is used
throughout the ICCPR. Perhaps the most compelling support of this in-
terpretations is in the preamble to the ICCPR itself, "Realizing that the
individual, having duties to other individuals and to the community to
which he belongs, is under a responsibility to strive for the promotion
and observance of the rights in the present Convention. '76
The ICCPR does specify that those who are bound by its terms are
not just states, but organizations and individuals.
Nothing in the present Covenant may be interpreted as implying for
any State, group or person any right to engage in any activity or per-
form any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms
recognized herein or at their limitation to a greater extent than is pro-
vided for in the present Covenant.77
An examination of the Traveaux Preparatiores of the ICCPR indi-
cates that the treaty was designed to reach individual action. "Al-
73. ICCPR, supra note 59 art. 2.
74. Id. art. 7.
75. Id. art 8.
76. Id.
77. Id., art. 5.
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though a suggestion was made that freedom of assembly should be pro-
tected only against 'governmental' interference, it was generally under-
stood that the individual should be protected against all kinds of inter-
ference in the exercise of this right."78
The only exception to the general application of rights in the pri-
vate sphere was made in regard to article 26 on the prohibition of dis-
crimination. Here, the treaty's history supports limiting the application
of the article to state action. 79 Interestingly enough, it was probably the
debate on the applicability of this provision to all actions, and to its re-
jection by the drafters, which led to the creation of the International
Convention on Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination.8 0 It
has also been considered the primary reason for the creation of the
Convention on the Elimination of All forms of Discrimination Against
Women. 81
Many countries, upon adopting the ICCPR, and the UN, began to
see article 26 as relevant to both state and private actions. 82 The Sen-
ate observed this trend in interpretation, and decided to reinforce its
position that article 26's antidiscrimination language would not apply
in the private sphere. An understanding to that effect was attached to
the Senate's ratification of the ICCPR.
In regard to the rest of the ICCPR, the official UN body in charge of
compliance, the UN Human Rights Committee has stated, "[t]he Cove-
nant by its substance was capable of extending rights to all persons ...
It should be considered to have a third party applicability."8 3 The lan-
guage of the ICCPR, its history, and its authoritative interpretation all
provide support for the applicability of rights to state and non-state ac-
tors. This conception is reflected in the modern trend in jurisprudence.
The traditional view of international law is that it regulates the
relations between nations.84 However, international human rights law
regulates conduct of individuals. 85 Many scholars have attempted to
limit the application of human rights law to only state actors. 86 There
78. U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/SR.121, p. 3 (F); A/2929 ch. VI sec. 139 (22 June 1973).
79. CLAPHAM, supra note 5, at 98-102.
80. Opened for signature Mar. 7, 1966, entered into force Jan. 4, 1969, 660 U.N.T.S.
195.
81. Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women,
U.N. GAOR 3rd Comm., 34th Sess., Agenda Item 75, U.N. Doc A/Res/34/180 (1980).
82. The UN Human Rights Committee has stated it is concerned about private dis-
crimination. U.N. Doc. CCPRIC/Rev. 1/Add. I p. 3 (21 Nov. 1989)
83. In other words, horizontal application. U.N. Doc. CCPRIC/SR 321 para. 34 (Op-
sahl); U.N. Doc. CCPRIC/SR 321 para. 46 (Graefrath); GAOR 36th Sess. Supp. No.
40(A/37/40), annex v. 93. For further elaboration of this idea, see discussion infra note 87
(22 Sept. 1982). For further elaboration of this idea, see discussion infra note 87
84. See, e.g., JAMES LESLIE BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
INTERNATIONAL LAW OF PEACE 1 (6th ed. 1963).
85. 1 INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE COLLECTED PAPERS OF HERSCH LAUTERPACHT 147-49
(E. Lauterpacht ed. 1970); T.O. Elias, New Perspectives and Conceptions in Contemporary
Public International Law, 10 DEN. J. INT'L L. & POLY 409, 411 (1981).
86. W.N. Nelson, Human Rights and Human Obligation, in HUMAN RIGHTS 275-291
(J.R. Pennock & J.W. Chapman, eds. 1981). LOUIS HENKIN, THE RIGHTS OF MAN TODAY 2
(1979), but see Henkin, supra note 62, at 10 for a position that has shifted from his origi-
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is another trend toward outlawing certain conduct or situations which
violate individual and collective rights regardless of the perpetrator. 87
Public international law, especially in the area of human rights,
has been an evolving and contextual approach in its interpretation. 88
Moving rights toward application in the private sphere has been a part
of human rights jurisprudence since their birth in modern form follow-
ing World War II. It is not surprising that one of the first national sys-
tems to adopt the vertical and horizontal application of rights was Ger-
many through its post-war constitution.89 Many other states have
followed either completely or partially adopting the application of hu-
man rights to both public and private activity. For example, the Neth-
erlands, 90 the UK,91 Canada, 92 South Africa, 93 Belgium, Austria, and
nal position toward the modern trend. THE RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, pt. VII, introductory note, at 144-45 (1987) does
not fully commit to any position, but states: "how a state treats individual human be-
ings... is a matter of international concern and a proper subject for regulation by inter-
national law."
87. See, e.g., CLAPHAM, supra note 5. It is clear that contemporary human rights law
places obligations on individuals. This can be seen in the creation of the International
Criminal Tribunals for Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, e.g., U.N. Doc. S/1994/1125 (Oc-
tober 4, 1994); decisions by the Inter-American Court on Human Rights, e.g., Velasquez
Rodriguez v. Honduras, Judgement 29 July 1988, reprinted in, 28 I.L.M. 291 (1989)
(placing an obligation on the State to investigate and punish those individuals responsible
for disappearances); and can even be seen in U.S. courts in Filartiga and its progeny, Fi-
lartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 878 (2d Cir. 1980).
88. See, e.g., Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa
in Namibia (South West Africa) Not Withstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (Na-
mibia), 1971 I.C.J. 16, 31(June 21); see, e.g., Ireland v. U.K., 25 EUR.CT.R. (ser.A) at 65
(1978).
89. Drittwirkung der Grundrechte or third-party effect of fundamental rights is well
established in German jurisprudence. Kenneth M. Lewan, The Significance of Constitu-
tional Rights for Private Law: Theory and Practice in West Germany,' 17 INT'L & COMP. L.
Q. 571 (1968).
90. The preamble to the Dutch Bill of Rights reads:
No more consideration should be given to the thought that all fundamental
rights in general do not have any effect whatsoever or, on the contrary, that
all fundamental rights have the same effect to the same extent on horizontal
relations. The question concerning the horizontal effectiveness need not be
answered in a similar fashion for every fundamental right. The answers
may differ from article to article, or from one part of an article to another,
perhaps only in respect to various particular categories found in a single ar-
ticle. This approach has the advantage of liberating the problem of horizon-
tal effectiveness from its dogmatic nature and of bringing it back to normal
proportions of constitutional interpretation.
Explanatory Preamble to the Bill on Fundamental Rights which was to become part of the
Dutch Constitution, cited in D. Simmons, Bestand und Bedeutung der Grundrechte im den
Niederlanden, 1978 EUROPAISCHE GRUNDRECHTE-ZEITSCHRIFT 450, at 454.
91. "If there is to be no interference by public authority, all the more so there should
be no interference by private individuals." Associated Newspaper Group v. Wade, (1979)
1 W.L.R. 697 at 709.
92. The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, prevents discrimination on the
grounds of sexual orientation. Veysey v. Canadian Correctional Service [1989] 44 CRR
364, [1990] 1 F.C. 321, 29 F.T.R. 74 (T.D.). The Quebec Charter of Human Rights and
Freedoms protects those infected with AIDS against discrimination, for example in rent-
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Switzerland. 94
The European Court of Human Rights has adopted the modern
trend. The European Convention on Human Rights "creates an obliga-
tion for states which involve the adoption of measures designed to se-
cure respect for private life even in the sphere of the relations of indi-
viduals between themselves."95  Additionally, the Convention
"sometimes requires positive measures to be taken, even in the sphere
of relations between individuals, if needed."96  One of the leading
authorities in this area has concluded, "states may not argue that in-
ternational human rights treaties have no relevance for activities of
private actors." 97
V. CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS OF THE RAEL CASE, POST RATIFICATION OF
THE ICCPR
"State action" is a concept that does not limit the application of
human rights. 98 For this reason the ICCPR affects the way rights are
viewed in courts. The U.S. Constitution places treaty law in the hierar-
chy of laws:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be
made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be
made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme
Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby,
and any Thing in the Constitution of Laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding. 9 9
Thus, treaties supercede previous inconsistent federal statutes. 00
Additionally, through the preemption doctrine, treaties can supercede
state laws. 10 1 The Supreme Court has held that the Constitution is su-
perior to inconsistent treaties. 102 The Court has also held that treaties
are subject to the rights found in the Bill of Rights. 103
ing an apartment or obtaining insurance. Bulletin de la Commission des Droits de la Per-
sonne du Quebec at 1-2 (4 June 1988).
93. The plurality position of the new South African Constitutional Court is that fun-
damental rights may apply directly in litigation between private parties. Almost every
Justice wrote a separate opinion in a case, where no clear majority position developed.
For interesting discussion of the horizontal application of rights and its importance to the
respect of human rights. See In the Matter of D. Du Plessis v. DeKlerk, G.F.J., Case
No.CCTS/95 (visited April 8, 1997), htp.www.wits.ac.za/judgments/duplessis.html>
94. CLAPHAM, supra note 5, at 179-181.
95. X. and Y. v. The Netherlands, 91 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 23 (1985).
96. Plattform Artze fur das Leben v. Austria, 139 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 32 (1988).
97. CLAPHAM, supra note 5, at 111.
98. Jordan J. Paust, The Other Side of Right: Private Duties Under Human Rights
Law, 5 HARv. HUMAN RTS. J. 51, 53 (1992).
99. U.S. CONST. art. VI.
100. Penhallow v. Doane's Adm'r, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 54, 85-93 (1795).
101. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
102. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
103. Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 324 (1988).
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There is an axiom in both treaty interoperation and constitutional
law that instructs courts, if possible to fashion an interpretation so that
both laws are met.104 Courts have frequently used the ICCPR and other
human rights instruments to inform their developing understanding of
constitutional or fundamental rights. Some courts, like those in the
U.K., have stated they feel "obliged" to look at human rights treaty law
when interpreting rights. 105 Australia and Canadian courts have found
this approach to be useful as well.' 06
Both textual comparison and a review of the evidence before the
Special Joint Committee of the Senate and House of Commons on the
Constitution, 1981-82, confirm that the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights was an important source of the terms chosen since
Canada ratified the Covenant in 1976, with unanimous consent of the
federal and provincial governments, the Covenant constitutes an obliga-
tion upon Canada under international law, by article two thereof, to
implement its provisions within this country. Although our Constitu-
tional tradition is not that a ratified treaty is self-executing within our
territory .... Nevertheless, unless the domestic law is clear to the con-
trary, it should be interpreted to conform with our international obliga-
tions. 107
This is also true generally in U.S. jurisprudence. It is traditionally
thought that the words of the amendments to the Constitution are not
precise, and that their scope is not static. The Constitution must draw
its meaning from evolving standards of a maturing society. 08 Today,
human rights law provides the mark of those evolving standards.
Given that the ICCPR has had a relatively short life as a ratified treaty
in the U.S., no case has yet to apply it as a treaty to inform constitu-
tional standards. Previously, courts have applied, ignored, and misin-
terpreted human rights law. 109
104. See, e.g., "An Act of Congress ought never to be construed to violate the laws of
nations, if any other possible construction remains." Murray v. Schooner Charming
Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804). "[This Court] must read the statutes to give effect
to each if we can do so while preserving their sense of purpose." Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S.
259, 267 (1981); U.S. v. Lee Yen Tai, 185 U.S. 213, 221 (1962). Another related axiom is
that courts should construe treaties "in a broad and liberal spirit, and when two construc-
tions are possible, one restrictive of rights that may be claimed under it and the other fa-
vorable to them, the latter is to be preferred." Asakura v. City of Seattle, 265 U.S. 332,
342 (1924).
105. Derbyshire County Council v. Times Newspapers Ltd., (1992) 1 Q.B. 770, 894;
(1992) 3 All E.R. 65, 93.
106. Mabo v. Queensland, 107 A.L.R. 1 (1992).
107. The Queen v. Videoflicks, 14 D.L.R. (4th) 10, 35-36 (Ont. C.A. 1984). See also, the
Queen v. Keegstra [1990] 1 S.C.R. 697, 749-58 (stating "I believe that the Charter should
generally be presumed to provide protection at least as great as that afforded by similar
provisions in international human rights documents which Canada has ratified.").
108. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
109. There are many cases in the U.S. of indirect application of human rights law. For
an overview, see Anne Bayefsky & Joan Fitzpatrick, International Human Rights Law in
United States Court: A Comparative Perspective, 14 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1, 72-80 (1992). An
example of where U.S. courts applied human rights law would be Lareau v. Manson, 507
F. Supp. 1177 (D. Conn. 1980); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 831 n.34 (1987) is
an example of where the plurality of the court made reference to international norms.
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Richard Lillich, a leading American scholar of international law,
believes that the proper way for human rights to be applied in U.S.
courts is as a mechanism to inform or contribute to the development of
U.S. constitutional and statutory interpretation. 10 Other noted schol-
ars have demonstrated how the human rights provisions in the UN
charter were a factor in resolving constitutional issues.' It has also
been posited that U.S. courts frequently use human rights law, whether
that be treaty, custom, or standards, but do not cite to item, because
U.S. jurists have a difficult time accepting the fact that the Constitution
is not always superior in terms of rights protection compared with hu-
man rights law.112
Even if that may be the case, courts have recognized the impor-
tance of human rights law to constitutional interpretation:
International custom and treaties... limiting attacks on civilians are
not derogatory to our Constitution. Rather they expand and give sub-
stance to a developing enriched concept of right of the individual that
harmonizes with our Constitutional developments. 113
In Rael v. Taylor, the first hurdle the plaintiff will have to cross
will be that of convincing the court that the "state action" doctrine is ir-
relevant. Some courts may accept a Shelley v. Kraemer type argument
that the prolonged court ordered state intervention in this case consti-
tutes sufficient state action to entertain a private right of action based
on the Constitution. 114 Especially considering that the exercise of the
descendants of the original settlers' rights have been interrupted with
state assistance for well over three decades. Nonetheless, the use of
this type of analysis, while not improper given the slippery nature of
the "state action" doctrine, it would be contrary to the current trend in
The following year in a case with almost the same facts the plurality ignored human
rights law, but the dissent felt the U.S. was obligated to read constitutional standards in
light of the human rights law, Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1988) (this case was
decided well before the ICCPR's ratification by the Senate). See Ved P. Nanda, The
United States Reservation to the Ban on the Death Penalty for Juvenile Offenders: An Ap-
praisal under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 42 DEPAUL L.
REV. 1311 (1993). Linder v. Calero Portocarrero, 747 F. Supp. 1452, 1462 (S.D. Fla. 1990)
is an example of a case where the court based its decision on an antiquated and simply
incorrect notion of human rights, stating "torture by a non-state actor is not a violation of
international law."
110. This usage would avoid the problem of an "independent rule of decision." Richard
B. Lillich, Invoking International Human Rights Law in Domestic Courts, 54 CINN. L.
REV. 367, 410 (1985).
111. Oscar Schachter, The Charter and the Constitution: the Human Rights Provisions
in American Law, 4 VAND. L. REV. 643, 644, 658 (1951). Professor Schachter cites Oyama
v. California, 185 U.S. 579, 604 (1948) (Murphy, J. and Rutledge. J., concurring) and
Namba v. McCourt, 185 Or. 579, 604 (1949) to support his position.
112. Bernhard Schuluter, The Domestic Status of the Human Rights Clauses of the
United Nations Charter, 61 CALIF. L. REV. 100, 157 (1973).
113. In the Matter of the Petition of Mahmoud El Abed Ahmad v. Wigen, 726 F. Supp.
389, 411 (E.D. N.Y. 1989).
114. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1947).
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human rights law. On the other hand, the court could interpret human
rights law as found in the ICCPR [now the law in Colorado] to eliminate
the "state action" hurdle found in previous applications of the Constitu-
tion. This would conform to a trend in comparative jurisprudence, in-
ternational jurisprudence, and even in the U.S..
There has been a little linear movement from the time of the thir-
teenth amendment to date as to the horizontal application of constitu-
tional rights. Recently, that movement has increased with the horizon-
tal application of human rights . A logical extension of this movement
would be its application to constitutional rights.
Perhaps even predating the thirteenth amendment, the common
law applied rights in a horizontal fashion. The notion of sic utere tuo at
a lienum non laedas [one cannot use their property to harm the prop-
erty of another] can be found in both U.S. and international law. 115
While this concept may typically have been seen as a limit on the indi-
vidual right of the property owner, for example through a nuisance ac-
tion, the concept really is about overlapping property rights. This
situation can be almost directly analogous to horizontal application of
constitutional rights.
Two modern examples in U.S. courts demonstrate this idea. In en-
vironmental law, which limits property rights to protect complex eco-
systems and related values. 116 Also in cases where the traditional usu-
fructory rights of Native Americans cause a collision between hard title
to property and treaty commitments and tradition-based practices. 117
This cases have a common recognition of a constitutional right to prop-
erty on both sides and an attempt by the courts to balance these inter-
ests.
In the human rights field, the U.S. has quite effortlessly used the
horizontal application of human rights in foreign countries. For exam-
ple, economic sanctions could be applied by the U.S. government based
on the violation of an employee's human rights by an employer. 118 Re-
cently, President Clinton placed investment sanctions on Burma citing
the violation of the human rights of the political opposition, workers,
115. See, e.g., Grundgesetz (Constitution][GG], art. 14, sec. 2 (F.R.G) (holding that
property imposes duties in that it should also serve the public weal).
116. At present the U.S. Supreme Court is considering a case which highlights the
limits that can be placed on private property or perhaps better stated the conflicting uses
of private property. See, e.g., Robert Marquand, Court Weighs Widow's Right to a Lake
Tahoe View, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Feb. 27, 1997, at 1.
117. Recognition of usufructuary rights in Anglo-American jurisprudence traces back
to the Statutes of Merton (1235) and Westminster (1285). U.S. case law has sustained
traditional usufructuary rights of Native Americans protected by a treaty, except where
explicitly eliminated by an act of Congress. See United States v. Michigan, 653 F.2d 277,
279 (6th Cir. 1981); People v. LeBlanc, 248 N.W.2d 199 (1976); Lac Courte Oreilles Band of
Lake Superior Chippewa Indians v. Voight, 700 F.2d 341 (7-h Cir. 1983).
118. The entire Generalized System of Preference system and the related Caribbean
Basin Initiative is based on this notion. See generally, Philip Alston, Labor Rights Provi-
sions in United States Trade Law: "Aggressive Unilateralism?", 15 HUM. RTS. Q. 1 (1993).
The GSP provisions can be found in See. 502 of the Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C.A. § 2462
(1988).
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and students as his reasoning. 119 Further, a recent U.S. District Court
decision held that UNOCAL, an American company doing business in
Burma, could be held liable for violating the human rights of Burmese
victims.' 2 0 On April 14, 1997, the White House announced an agree-
ment between clothing manufactures, labor organizations, and human
rights groups designed to protect the human rights of workers around
the world from violations committed by their employers.' 2'
From the above examples it can be concluded that the U.S. has a
history of horizontal application of rights, even if not termed as such.
Given the recent ratification of the ICCPR, calling for the application of
rights in the private sphere, and the U.S. history of applying rights in
such a manner, it is not only appropriate but an obligation for the court
to read Colorado Constitution in light of the ICCPR.
The roots of the horizontal application of human rights in the Colo-
rado Constitution can be found generally in the areas of property and
the prohibition of discrimination. Also, the Colorado Constitution con-
tains a number of provisions that directly apply to the private sphere.
It contains a prohibition on slavery similar to the federal law. 122 There
is also a takings clause that prohibits the taking of private property
from one individual by another without compensation.123 Also in prop-
erty law, there is a provision that "private property shall not be taken
for private use unless by the consent of the owner."' 24
Generally, the Colorado Supreme Court has held that rights
"should be protected from infringement or diminution by any person as
well as any department of the government.' 25 The Court, however, has
determined created a limiting principal by stating that one person's
rights cannot detrimentally affect or harm another persons rights.126 In
the area of discrimination, the Colorado Supreme court has held: "[A]n
inherent human right will be upheld by this court against action by any
person or department of the government which would destroy such a
right or result in discrimination in the manner in which enjoyment
thereof is to be permitted as between persons of different races, creeds,
or color[s]." 12 7
119. Public Papers of the Presidents: Statements of Investment Sanction Against
Burma, Apr. 22, 1997, available in LEXIS, Executive Library, Presidential Documents
File.
120. Benson v. UNOCAL, Case No. 96-6959 (C.D. CA 1997)(UNOCAL's motion to dis-
miss was denied).; see also, Yindee Lertcharoenchok, UNOCAL PLEA, Nation (April 3,
1997).
121. Christina Nifong, No Sweat 'pact to Cut Garment Worker Abuse, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR, Apr. 14, 1997 at 3.
122. COLO. CONST. art. II, § 26. (1876).
123. Id. art. II, § 15.
124. Id. art. II, § 14.
125. Colorado Anti-Discrimination Comm'n v. Case, 151 Colo. 235, 245, 380 P.2d 34,
40 (1962). There also appears to be the acceptance of the horizontal application to the
right to privacy. Wells v. Premier Indus., 691 P.2d 765, 768 (Colo. Ct. App. 1984).
126. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934), cited in Colorado Anti-Discrimination
Comm'n, 151 Colo. at 245, 380 P.2d at 41.
127. Colorado Anti-Discrimination Comm'n, 151 Colo. at 245, 380 P.2d at 41.
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The following looks at some of the possible constitutional argu-
ments presented in Rael v. Taylor, given the self-executing nature of
the Bill of Rights of the Colorado Constitution. Article II, section 3 of
the Constitution of the state of Colorado provides: "All persons have
certain natural, essential and inalienable rights, among which may be
reckoned the right of enjoying and defending their lives and liberties; of
acquiring possessing and protecting property; and of seeking and ob-
taining their safety and happiness. 128
VI. PROPERTY12
9
The ratification of the ICCPR ensures that the court must look at
the property rights of the plaintiff and defendants. The court should
balance these rights. If possible, the court should strike a balance
which recognizes the overlapping nature of the property rights in con-
tention. For example, this could be achieved via time, place, and man-
ner restrictions of the exercise of the plaintiffs' usufructory rights and of
the defendant's underlying fee.
The ICCPR may also be helpful at defining the desirable values
underlying the respect for property rights. In human rights, the con-
cept of property goes beyond mere title. It recognizes the complex social
relation between an individual and other individuals and the land it-
self.130 From this perspective, the UN Human Rights Committee in ad-
versarial cases has found that individuals are entitled to a continuing
relationship with lands and natural resources according to traditional
patterns of use or occupancy, notwithstanding lack of hard title to the
land.13 1 Without respect for these type of property rights, a whole range
of human rights violations could be produced. 132
In Rael v. Taylor, the law of the "commons" in both Mexican law
and U.S. law supports the descendants of the original settlers' tradi-
tional usurfructory rights to la sierra. These usufructory rights are also
supported by the legal principles of custom, easement, and equitable
128. Medina v. People, 154 Colo. 4, 387 P.2d 733 (1963).
129. COLO. CONST. art. II, §§ 14, 15 (adding a protection that property cannot be taken
for private use without consent or compensation).
130. For an interesting discussion of how U.S. property law should reflect this complex
social relation, see Jack. M. Beerman and Joseph William Singer, Baseline Questions in
Legal Reasoning: The Example of Property in Jobs, 23 GA. L. REV. 911, 946-956 (1989).
131. See, e.g., Ominayak, Chief of the Lubicon Lake Band v. Canada, Communication
No. 267/1984, Report of the Human Rights Committee, U.N. GAOR, 45 th Sess., Supp. No.
40, Vol. 2, at 1, U.N. Doc. A/45/40, Annex 9 (A) (1990) (views adopted March 26, 1990);
Lovelace v. Canada, Communication No. R.6/24, Report of the Human Rights Committee,
U.N. GAOR, 36th Sess., Supp. No. 40, at 166, U.N. Doc. A/36/40, Annex 18 (1977) (views
adopted Dec. 29, 1997); U.N. Subcommission on Prevention and Protection of Minorities,
Study of the Problem of Discrimination Against Indigenous Populations, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1986/7, Add.4, at 39 (1986) ("It must be understood that, for indigenous
populations, land does not represent simply a possession or means of production .... It is
also essential to understand the special and profoundly spiritual relationship of indige-
nous peoples with Mother Earth as basic to their existence and to all their beliefs, cus-
toms, traditions and culture.").
132. Id.
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trust. The usufructory rights exist, but it is for the court to determine
whether it should be respected/ To do so, the court should openly dis-
cuss and weigh the competing rights, taking into account the complex
and culturally unique relationship between the settlers' descendants
and the land.
VII. LIFE AND LIBERTY
The Colorado Supreme Court has interpreted the rights of life and
liberty to mean that one has a right to practice a learned profession. 133
It has also determined that one has the right to pursue a legitimate
trade or business.134 This idea finds historical support in the interpre-
tation of rights by the U.S. Supreme Court, which has held that life
means something more than a mere basal existence. 135 It is interesting
to note that this idea has not received much attention recently in U.S.
courts, even though this theory has been expanded and followed in
some states.
136
The concept of a right to life and liberty has had such a pervasive
influence that other countries have started to follow it. In India, for ex-
ample, a right to life and liberty provision similar to that in the Colo-
rado Constitution has been incorporated in its own. 137 The Supreme
Court of India has interpreted that clause to mean:
An equally important facet of that right [to life] is the right to a liveli-
hood because, no person can live without the means of living, that is
the means of living a livelihood. If the right to a livelihood is not
treated as a part of the Constitutional right to life, the easiest way of
depriving a person of his right to life would be to deprive him of his
means to a livelihood to the point of abrogation. Such deprivation
would not only denude life of its effective content and meaningfulness
but it would make life impossible to live. There is thus a close nexus
between life and the means to a livelihood and as such that, which
alone makes it possible to live, leave aside what makes life liveable,
must be deemed to be an integral component of the right to life.' 38
This case demonstrates the manner in which one country has ap-
plied a right to life and liberty in a manner consistent with the ICCPR.
The ICCPR has been interpreted to encompass a cluster of rights re-
lated to the right to life and liberty. It language is very clear, "in no
133. Prouty v. Heron, 127 Colo. 168, 255 P.2d 755 (1953).
134. Olin Mathieson Chem. Corp. v. Francis, 134 Colo. 160, 301 P.2d 139 (1956).
135. Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1877).
136. E.g., "The right to work I have assumed was the most precious liberty that man
possesses. Man has indeed, as much right to work as he has to live, to be free and to own
property. To work means to eat and it also means to live." Barsky v. Board of Regents,
347 U.S. 442, 472 (1954) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
137. "No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to pro-
cedure established by law." INDIA CONST. article 21. "No person shall be deprived of life,
liberty or property, without due process of law." COLO. CONST. art. II, § 25.
138. Olga Tellis and Others v. Bombay Municipal Corporation and Others, 3 SCC [Su-
preme Court of India] 545 (1985).
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case a people may be deprived of its own means of subsistence."' 39
This concept of the right to life and liberty is very important in Rael
v. Taylor, for the descendants of the original settlers were using the
land to allow them to farm, and live in a self-sufficient fashion. Now,
Taylor is using the land exclusively for profit-making endeavors at the
expense of the descendants who are being displaced from their previous
self-sufficient existence to one of poverty and dependence on the state
for assistance.140
VIII. RIGHT TO CULTURE AND COMMUNITY
"The enumeration in this constitution of certain rights shall not be
construed to deny, impair or disparage others retained by the people."14 1
While not specifically protected in the Colorado Constitution, the right
to one's culture or community is protected by the ICCPR:
In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist,
persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in
community with other members of their group, to enjoy their own cul-
ture, to profess and practice their own religion, or to use their own lan-
guage. 4 2
While U.S. courts have never specifically recognized culture or
community as a right, various articles of the Constitution have been in-
terpreted to support what could be construed as a right to culture or
community.14 3 For example, the right to exercise religion freely may
implicate lifestyle choices, such as subsistence farming, which deserve
protection. 44 The right to associate may protect the nonexclusive use of
public parks by racist groups. 4 5 Regarding education, there is the right
to teach the language of choice.14 6 There is also the right for parents to
direct the upbringing and education of their children. 147 Parents have a
right to have a child's cultural heritage considered in curriculum devel-
opment. 148 Finally, regarding family, there is a recognition of the ex-
tenuated family relationship. 4 9 There is also a right to marry within a
chosen community. 5 0
A court interpreting the meaning of article II, section 28 of the
139. ICCPR, supra note 59, art. 1, para. 2.
140. Stoller, supra note 9.
141. COLO. CONST. art. II, § 28.
142. ICCPR, supra note 59, art. 27.
143. The line of cases cited stand for the idea that religious and culture differences of
subgroups must be respected, when those subgroups' goals are shared with the larger
community. In the Rael v. Taylor case, the common values are self-sufficiency and the
sustainable family existence. See Martha Minow, Pluralisms, 21 CONN. L. REV. 965
(1989).
144. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
145. Gilmore v. City of Montgomery, 417 U.S. 556 (1974).
146. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 556 (1974).
147. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1924).
148. Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974).
149. Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
150. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1966).
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Colorado Constitution would be well advised to consider the ICCPR's
protection of individual rights.15' First there is a direct statement in
the ICCPR regarding the protection of culture and community. Second,
the detrimental impact the actions of Taylor have had on the unique
community and culture of the descendants of the original settlers of the
Sangre de Cristo land grant has been well documented. 152 What had
developed in Southern Colorado was a unique community and culture.
In the time since la sierra has been fenced and the usufructory rights
denied tot he descendants of the original settlers, there has been a visi-
ble, but hopefully not irreversible, loss of community and culture.
IX. POTENTIAL ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE HORIZONTAL APPLICATION OF
CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES
Human rights are important considerations in any society, whether
it be a local, national, or global society. Many people would differ on the
exact content of these rights, nor would most people know from where
human rights are derived, or how they are directly relevant to their
lives. This shows that legislatures, courts, lawyers and the public will
continue to content with the content and significance of human rights
for many years to come.
Some may argue that the application of constitutional principles in
the private sphere will result in an unwanted intrusion of government
into every facet of life. They worry an undesirable "Big Brother" moral
police would need to be created to apply rights in the private sphere.
This is not what the application of constitutional rights in the private
sphere would entail. Private life, which truly does not impact the lives
of others, remains untouched Court review is required only when one
perceives ones rights have been violated by another person. If such a
conflict arises, the ICCPR indicates that reinforcing the existing power
relations such as male domination and racism would not be valued.
Nonetheless, it would be for the court to weigh the competing values in
an open fashion to make a determination as to which right should be
upheld.153
Others may argue that the recognition of a horizontal application of
rights will lead to increased litigation and clog the courts with frivolous
claims. This complaint is similar to almost any legal change in a liti-
gious society. Mechanisms already exist to reduce and eliminate frivo-
lous claims. Presently, the courts deal with many cases which are even-
tually dismissed as frivolous claims. In these cases, after prolonged
debate, many of the plaintiffs eventually have their day in court based
on the common law or a statute. Recognition of a private sphere of con-
stitutionally applied rights would not in fact generate a significant in-
151. Courts should be cautious in dismissing a case where the pleadings show that an
alleged violation of a constitutional right is at issue, since fundamental rights and public
policy questions are necessarily involved. Davidson v. Dill, 180 Colo. 123, 503 P.2d 157
(1972).
152. Stoller, supra note 9.
153. See generally, Pickle supra note 47.
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crease in court work loads. The courts would have a much easier analy-
sis in these cases, having to weigh only the individual party's rights
against the other, without governmental concerns. The courts seem
quite capable of weighing, creating methods, and discussing competing
interests and rights, and thus it would be no major change for the
courts to apply constitutional rights in the private sphere.154
Another possible problem would be the perceived interference with
the democratic process. 55 The difficulty in this case is how democracy
is defined. While some would define it as a society where human rights
are respected, others would choose a forma; definition linked to a spe-
cific form of representative government. 156 For people thus defining
democracy, the ICCPR may constitute "imported" values that are some-
how delegitimized because they did not follow the traditional law mak-
ing process. 157 This form of government and legislating is not necessar-
ily more democratic or reflective of the will of the people then the
process used to create the ICCPR.
Another possible criticism is a revival of substantive due process,
leading to open-ended modes of constitutional adjudication and to the
adoption of "rights" not traceable to the Constitution's text, structure,
or history.158 In this instance, the law being used is directly tied to con-
stitutionally provided process. The rights included in the ICCPR are
clearly defined by its text, history, and legal interpretations. The proc-
ess of adjudicating these rights is transparent.
X. CONCLUSION
Adapting to a changing world is not easy, especially when these
changes do not respect traditional geopolitical boundaries. Human
rights law is one of the first sets of laws to seriously deal with this hur-
dle. Such a global approach may better reflect today's reality, than one
tied to a specific idea of law making and democracy grounded in a geo-
political entity. 159 It is worth noting that the U.S. can effectively ac-
commodate this type of law via the established constitutional mecha-
nism for treaty adoption.
What has happened to the descendants of the original settlers of
154. See generally, CLAPHAM supra note 5, at 90, 298.
155. See Bradley, supra note 1 (discussing of how certain applications of customary
international law in U.S. courts may undermine constitutional integrity).
156. Some scholars have seen a tension between majoritarian politics that is more di-
rectly electorally accountable and the process used to create human rights law. Bayefsky
& Fitzpatrick, supra note 109, at 87. While this criticism, from a formal point of view,
may resonate some in relation to customary international law, it is difficult to see how
human rights treaties in the U.S. context are disconnected from the electoral process and
its accountability.
157. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7.
158. This approach has been controversial. See, e.g., GERALD GUNTHER, INDIVIDUAL
RIGHTS IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 103 (5th ed. 1992).
159. Most disciplines are struggling with today's interdependent world. For example,
traditional normative political theory tied to fixed borders may be seen as outmoded. See,
e.g., Daniel Warner, An Ethics of Human Rights: Two Interrelated Misunderstandings, 24
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 395, 396 (1996).
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the Sangre de Cristo land grant is best understood as a violation of their
human rights. The disruption of their fundamental rights like those to
property, livelihood, and culture, have resulted in a loss of dignity
which occurs when anyone has had their means to self-sufficiency and
their mechanism to contribute to their community and society stripped
from them. The relevance of the Colorado Constitution to this problem
has been highlighted by ratification of the ICCPR.160
The ICCPR shifts constitutional review of alleged violations of
rights from the state/non state action dichotomy to a more productive
one which forces the court to balance the competing rights involved.
Such an analysis will no doubt uncover a number of values underlying
the competing rights.
It is unfortunate that this analysis was not available from the be-
ginning of the controversy, for with its application it would have been
possible to avoid a great deal of suffering by fashioning a remedy that
respects the overlapping nature of the rights involved. Such a decision
is long overdue and with the ratification of the ICCPR, not only does a
vehicle exist to reach this conclusion, its use is mandated.
160. There is no problem of ex post facto application, because it is the Colorado Constitu-
tion that is being applied. The ICCPR is simply informing its involving interpretation. It
should be kept in mind, that as the legal and social context changes, applying the old rule
or interpretation means something different. See, e.g. Karl Llewellyn, The Case Law Sys-
tem in America, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 989 (1988).
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